The Riddle of Joy
Over forty years after his death, the writings of C. S.
Lewis continue to be read, discussed, and studied by millions of adoring fans.
There seems to be something in Lewis that appeals to almost everyone. He is
read by men and women, adults and children, Protestants and Catholics, scholars
and laymen. A new movie, based on his best-selling children's classic The
Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, is expected to be a mega-hit in theatres.{1}
It's difficult to think of another writer who is read (and appreciated) by such
a broad spectrum of humanity as C. S. Lewis.
But what accounts for this broad, popular appeal? Doubtless
many reasons could be given. Lewis wrote on such a wide variety of topics, in
such a diversity of literary genres and styles, that almost anyone can find
pleasure in something he wrote. Further, he wrote for a general audience. Even
when he's discussing very heady philosophical and theological topics, he
remains quite accessible to the intelligent layman who wants to understand.
Nevertheless, I tend to agree with Peter Kreeft, who notes that while "many
virtues grace Lewis's work . . . the one that lifts him above any other
apologetical writer . . . is how powerfully he writes about Joy."{2}
Now it's important to understand that when Lewis writes of
Joy, he's using this term in a very particular way. He's not just speaking
about a general sort of happiness, or joyful thoughts or feelings. Rather, he's
speaking about a desire, but a very unique and special kind of desire. In Surprised
by Joy, his spiritual autobiography, Lewis describes it as "an unsatisfied
desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction."{3}
But what did he desire? The question haunted Lewis for
years. What was it that he wanted? Through trial and error he came to
realize that he didn't simply want a feeling, a subjective, inner
experience of some kind. Indeed, he later said that "all images and sensations,
if idolatrously mistaken for Joy itself, soon confessed themselves inadequate.
. . . Inexorably Joy proclaimed, 'You want--I myself am your want of--something
other, outside, not you or any state of you.'"{4}
In an attempt to find the mysterious object of his desire,
Lewis plunged himself into various pursuits and pleasures. But nothing
in his experience could satisfy this desire. Ironically, these failures
suggested a possible solution to Lewis. What if nothing in this world could
satisfy his desire because the object of his desire was other-worldly?
A radical proposal, and we turn to it now.
The Argument from Desire
What was Lewis to make of this rather mysterious, intense,
and recurrent desire that nothing in the world could satisfy? Did the desire
have any real significance? Did anything actually exist that
could satisfy this desire? Or was the whole thing just a lot of moonshine?
Although this question haunted Lewis for years and took him down many dead-end
streets in pursuit of the mysterious object of his desire, he eventually came
to believe that he had discovered the answer.
In The Pilgrim's Regress, he wrote of his remarkable
solution to the riddle of Joy--the desire we are now considering--as follows:
It appeared to me . . . that if a
man diligently followed this desire, pursuing the false objects until their
falsity appeared and then resolutely abandoning them, he must come out at last
into the clear knowledge that the human soul was made to enjoy some object that
is never fully given--nay, cannot even be imagined as given--in our present mode
of subjective and spatio-temporal experience. This Desire was, in the soul, as
the Siege Perilous in Arthur's castle--the chair in which only one could sit.
And if nature makes nothing in vain, the One who can sit in this chair must
exist.{5}
In other words, Lewis reasoned from this intense desire,
which nothing in the world could satisfy, to an object of desire that
transcended the world. He gradually became convinced that this Supreme Object
of human desire is God and heaven!
Following Peter Kreeft, we can formulate the argument as
follows:{6}
1. Every natural or innate desire we experience has a corresponding real
object that can satisfy the desire.
2. We experience an innate desire which nothing in this world can satisfy.
3. Therefore, there must be a real object that transcends the world which can satisfy this
desire.
Now this is a valid argument in which the conclusion follows
logically from the premises. So if someone wants to challenge the argument's
conclusion, they must first challenge one of its premises. And, as I'm sure you
can imagine, the argument has certainly had its detractors. But what sort of
objections have they raised? Have they shown the argument to be unsound? And
how have Lewis's defenders responded to their objections? We'll now turn to
consider some of these questions.
Some Clarifications and Objections
The first premise of Lewis's argument claims that every
natural or innate desire we experience has a corresponding real object that can
satisfy the desire. But what is meant by a "natural" or "innate" desire?
It's important to be clear about this.
We experience natural and innate desires, as well as
artificial and conditioned desires--and there's a big difference between the
two. Natural and innate desires are desires that are natural and innate to us
as human beings. They arise from our nature and are part of the human
condition. As Peter Kreeft observes, "We naturally desire things like food,
drink, sex, knowledge, friendship, and beauty."{7}
But of course we desire other things as well: fast cars,
fashionable clothes, "flying through the air like Superman . . . and lands like
Oz."{8} Such artificial and conditioned desires don't arise from our nature.
Rather, they come from "society, or advertising, or fiction."{9} Also, such
desires may, or may not, have a corresponding real object that can
satisfy them. Just think of someone's desire to visit the land of Oz!
Thus, it's important to understand that Lewis is not
arguing that all our desires have real objects of satisfaction. He's
claiming only that all our natural and innate desires do. Having
clarified this issue, we'll return to consider objections to this first premise
in a moment.
But first, what if someone objects to Lewis's second
premise, namely, that we have an innate desire which nothing in the world
can satisfy?{10} For example, what if someone admitted that they were not
perfectly satisfied now, but believed they would be if only they had the best
of everything money can buy? Well, unfortunately this experiment has already
been tried--and has repeatedly failed. Just think of all the people who are very
wealthy, but still not perfectly satisfied. Indeed, some of them are downright
miserable!
But what if one of them isn't? What if someone claimed that
he is perfectly satisfied right now? Admittedly, we can't really argue with
such a person. We can only ask him to be honest--if not with us, at least with
himself. Even so, however, this would not necessarily show that Lewis's
argument is false. It may only show that the person who makes such a claim is
somehow defective, like a colorblind person claiming that there is no such
thing as color. If most people experience an innate desire which nothing in
the world can satisfy, then Lewis's conclusion may still follow. But before
we can be sure, we must first revisit that problematic first premise.
You'll remember that Lewis argued that every natural or
innate desire (like our desire for food, drink, or friendship) has a
corresponding object that can satisfy the desire. Thus, there really are
such things as food, drink, and friends. There seems to be a correlation
between our natural desires and objects that can satisfy them.
But there's a problem. As John Beversluis observed:
How could Lewis have known that
every natural desire has a real object before knowing that Joy has one? I can
legitimately claim that every student in the class has failed the test only if
I first know that each of them has individually failed it. The same is true of
natural desires.{11}
In other words, why think that every natural desire
has an object that can satisfy it? Such questions appear to raise difficulties
for Lewis's argument. So how have Lewis's supporters responded?
Peter Kreeft has written:
[T]he proposition "every natural,
innate desire has a real object" is understood to be true because nature does
nothing in vain, and this . . . is seen to be true by understanding the concept
expressed in . . . the word "nature." Nature is meaningful . . . full of design
and purpose . . . arranging a fit between organism and environment . . .
desire and satisfaction . . .{12}
Kreeft seems to be saying that once we truly grasp the
concept of "nature," we'll see that it's "full of design and purpose." And once
we grasp this, then we'll see that "nature does nothing in vain." And if this
is so, then our natural desires must have objects that can satisfy them.
Thus, if we experience a natural desire which nothing in the world can satisfy,
there must be something beyond the world which can satisfy it.
But notice that this only follows if nature does
nothing in vain. And why should anyone believe this? Unless there's a Cosmic
Designer, why should one think that nature is meaningful, full of design
and purpose?
The Value of the Argument
In order to effectively reason from a deep, unsatisfied
natural desire that nothing in the world can satisfy, to something beyond the
world which can satisfy it, one must first know, or at least have good reason
to believe, that all our natural desires have real objects of
satisfaction. If they don't, then maybe there's just not any object that
can satisfy the desire we're considering.
Now, of course, someone might well say, "Look, if all the
natural desires we can check on, like our desires for food, drink, sex, and
knowledge, have real sources of satisfaction, then wouldn't it be reasonable to
infer that in the case of this one mysterious desire, which nothing in the
world can satisfy, that there's also a real source of satisfaction?" Well, yes,
I think this would be quite reasonable. Of course, the conclusion is only probable,
not necessary. But in some places this is all Lewis himself claimed. In Mere
Christianity he wrote:
The Christian says: Creatures are
not born with desires unless satisfaction for these desires exists . . . If I
find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most
probable explanation is that I was made for another world.{13}
Now this is an interesting argument and it may suggest an
additional premise which has been assumed, but not directly stated. For why
does the Christian say that creatures are not born with desires unless
satisfaction for these desires exists? Isn't it because we believe that there's
a benevolent Creator and Designer of the natural world and its creatures? And
if this is true, then it seems quite plausible that things have been
intentionally designed so that there's a match between our natural
desires and sources of satisfaction. And actually, there are very good reasons,
completely independent of Lewis's argument, for believing that a Creator and
Designer of nature does exist!
So it seems that the primary value of Lewis's argument may
lie in showing us that it's reasonable to believe that our Creator and Designer
is also the Supreme Object of our desire. And this resonates quite well with
the oft-quoted words of Augustine, "Thou hast made us for Thyself and our
hearts are restless until they rest in Thee."{14}
Notes
- The film is scheduled to be released December 9, 2005.
- Peter J. Kreeft, "C. S. Lewis's Argument from Desire," in G. K. Chesterton and C. S. Lewis: The Riddle of Joy, eds. Michael H. MacDonald and Andrew A. Tadie (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1989), 256.
- C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1955), 17-18, cited in Kreeft, 253.
- C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 220-21, cited in Kreeft, 253.
- C. S. Lewis, The Pilgrim's Regress, (U.S.A.: Eerdmans, 1992), 204-05.
- Kreeft, 250.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- For Kreeft's discussion see "C. S. Lewis's Argument from Desire," 267.
- John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1985), 19, cited in Kreeft, "C. S. Lewis's Argument from Desire," 267.
- Kreeft, 269.
- C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 105, cited in Kreeft, "C. S. Lewis's Argument from Desire," 254 (emphasis mine).
- Augustine, Confessions, 1:1, cited in Kreeft, "C. S. Lewis's Argument from Desire," 263.
© 2005 Probe Ministries
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About the Author Dr. Michael Gleghorn is a research associate with Probe Ministries. He also serves as an instructor at Grand Canyon University where he teaches Christian Worldview. He earned a B.A. in psychology from Baylor University, a Th.M. in systematic theology from Dallas Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. in Theological Studies (also from Dallas Theological Seminary). Michael and his wife Hannah have two children. They are active in a local church in Surprise, AZ. |
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